In Pasadena, California, there\u2019s a cute red brick courtyard where one storefront isn\u2019t like the rest. The glass doors open onto a sparse industrial hallway, which leads to a sunlit foyer with a large spiral staircase. Go up, and you\u2019ll see a typical coworking space: open tables, healthy snacks, a collection of meeting rooms with glass walls. Follow one hallway most of the way back, and you\u2019ll find Office 18.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
There are no signs of life in this tiny private office that\u2019s supposed to be the headquarters of Odyssey Robot, an upstart US drone company. We saw three small desks and chairs, but no power strips, no monitors, no keyboards or chargers or decorations. Two of the desks were covered with sealed cardboard packages.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
This room is the latest proof: The FCC\u2019s ban on foreign-made drones is a bad joke.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nOn December 22nd, 2025, the US government claimed \u2014 without a shred of public evidence \u2014 that foreign consumer drones posed an unacceptable threat to national security. With the help of other agencies, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr banned all future foreign drones<\/a> from entering the country without a special new waiver.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Like with Carr\u2019s make-it-make-sense consumer internet router ban<\/a>, that waiver has nothing to do with the security of these products. The application includes zero questions about restricting or improving the technology itself.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Instead, it gives Carr and President Donald Trump the power to decide losers and winners while beating the \u201cAmerica First\u201d drum. Foreign companies have to submit a detailed plan to build their products in the US, including how much they intend to invest in US manufacturing \u2014 yet US-based Netgear got a waiver<\/a> from the router ban even though it made no commitment to produce devices outside Asia.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Consumer drones are effectively all made in China, and as of April, it appeared that no one planned to change that as a result of the FCC\u2019s foreign drone ban. Though some US dronemakers exist, they\u2019re pursuing a different and more lucrative opportunity: drones that spy and kill<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But Office 18 shows another gaping hole in the FCC\u2019s plan. Instead of creating new US consumer drone companies, it\u2019s incentivizing fake<\/em> ones instead.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n How easy is it to fool the FCC? Just lie on the paperwork, it seems.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Just whip up a new company that pretends<\/em> to build brand-new drones in the USA and count on no one noticing \u2014 even if your drones clearly use proprietary DJI wireless tech.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n DJI, the world\u2019s biggest drone company, didn\u2019t dominate drones just because of first-mover advantage<\/a>. It was technology. DJI\u2019s OcuSync and older Lightbridge real-time video transmission systems were and are the most reliable long-range, low-latency ways to remotely control a consumer-grade drone. Almost every time The Verge<\/em> has tested another brand, the signal hasn\u2019t been as reliable. It\u2019s a competitive advantage that DJI wouldn\u2019t easily share.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But OcuSync has a telltale fingerprint. It uses specific pairs of radio frequencies, pairs that appear in the FCC\u2019s databases.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n When software developer and journalist Konrad Iturbe began watching FCC databases for those frequencies, he realized that DJI was preparing to play a grand game of Whac-A-Mole<\/em> in the United States. Well ahead of the December 2025 drone ban, a host of new companies had suddenly appeared selling barely disguised versions of DJI technology. He dubbed them \u201cDJI front companies<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n One of the most prominent DJI clones to enter the US was Skyrover, which released a budget drone that was a dead ringer for the DJI Mini 4 Pro. Last July, DJI would not confirm or deny to The Verge<\/em> that \u201cSkyrover\u201d was a disguised version of its own drone<\/a>, even though security researchers confirmed its app included DJI code.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Then, in October, Iturbe helped us introduce you to Xtra<\/a>, the company that lets DJI sneak its popular cameras into the US. When we tested an Xtra camera versus a DJI camera, we found them so identical, it removed any doubt. Again, DJI would not confirm or deny.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n As a result, US citizens were still able to purchase DJI tech \u2014 only now, they were dealing with fly-by-night businesses, with no real guarantee of support in the future.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n This June, Iturbe discovered the most brazen attempt yet. The DJI fingerprint led him to the FCC filings for a company named Odyssey Robot, which does business as Galiview Tech. In March, it became the first DJI-equipped drone brand to get FCC approval since the drone ban began. DJI did not reply to requests for comment for this story.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n If Galiview was trying to hide the DJI connection, it didn\u2019t try very hard: The company\u2019s website even listed DJI\u2019s trademarked OcuSync tech as a Galiview feature.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Wasn\u2019t stopping clandestine Chinese hardware the whole point of the ban? How<\/em> could the FCC approve this drone?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Simple: On February 6th, a \u201cRandolph Howard Eason\u201d declared on an FCC form that Odyssey Robot\u2019s drone and controller were made in the United States, and nobody ever questioned that before rubber-stamping its application.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The FCC could have spotted the OcuSync frequencies, or that this supposedly US-manufactured gadget was tested by a Chinese lab, or that it used a Chinese-made antenna also used by another Chinese drone.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But it\u2019s easier than that. Odyssey Robot declared that its drone was designed, developed, and manufactured at 21 Miller Alley Suite 210 in Pasadena, California. Even a basic Google search can show you<\/a> that\u2019s not the address of a factory \u2014 it\u2019s a coworking space called Industrious that explicitly prohibits members<\/a> from manufacturing anything onsite.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Odyssey Robot also declared that its drones are assembled at eTak Worldwide Corporation in Grand Prairie, Texas. With 80,000 square feet of warehouse space and 15 loading docks, you could theoretically build drones there. But again, a basic Google search would show you that eTak isn\u2019t an assembler<\/a>; it\u2019s a recycling<\/em> company that collects e-waste, including old batteries<\/a>, then sorts and dismantles them.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Still, we wanted to be sure. We called up the receptionist at the coworking space in Pasadena; they confirmed that Odyssey Robot was actively renting a two-person private office. Official California business records claimed the company was operating out of Office 18. You know the rest: We found a lonely room with three unused desks topped with cardboard packages.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n If the FCC had ever seen the website for these drones, it could have found even more eyebrow-raising contradictions. The website claimed that \u201cGaliview Inc.\u201d was founded in 2022 and headquartered in San Francisco, even as it provided a Las Vegas phone number and a Pasadena address.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cBased in the heart of San Francisco\u2019s technology innovation hub, we\u2019ve been pushing the boundaries of what\u2019s possible in consumer drone technology,\u201d it claimed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n In reality, public records show that Galiview is not a corporation. It\u2019s a trademark of Odyssey Robot, LLC, which was formed in Delaware in January 2025 and registered in California last December, after what seems like an aborted attempt to call the brand \u201cFlyon\u201d instead. Other trademark filings from February 2026 show it planning at least three products: a Galiview Titan, Galiview Venus, and Galiview Nova.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The company never replied to my emails to contact@flyondrone.com, the one and only email address it has provided publicly. We found its only phone number disconnected: \u201cThe subscriber you have dialed is not in service.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n eTak Worldwide, the recycler, also wasn\u2019t answering emails or picking up the phone. \u201cSorry, but the user\u2019s mailbox can\u2019t accept any more messages,\u201d I heard time and again. We had no better luck with \u201ciNet Expert,\u201d an earlier company from eTak\u2019s founder that claimed to offer wholesale computer parts. Every time I tried the company\u2019s phone tree, the answer was always a robotic \u201cNo one is available.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But when I realized iNet Expert was just 30 minutes from my house, I decided to pay it a visit.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The building was locked, but through the window I saw something strange. The primary decoration was a nearly floor-to-ceiling marketing image for a smartphone screen protector from 2014, from a company called Rudaor. It appears that iNet tried to become a US distributor, judging by the roughly 300 views on YouTube<\/a>. On the windows of iNet\u2019s office, there were also signs for Hirutech USA<\/a>, the defunct US arm of a Taiwanese electronics business development firm that once occupied the same address.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n 1\/3<\/strong> The whole building was a time capsule \u2014 and yet, it\u2019s still getting a few shipments from overseas, including on July 15th, according to import records<\/a> collected by ImportYeti.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n eTak\u2019s founder has a history of lending out his business address<\/em>, I thought.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But when I finally stumble across a cell phone number for Richard Lee, founder of eTak and iNet Expert, he says he\u2019d never heard of Odyssey Robot until a week or so earlier.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cI\u2019m happy you called me, because we totally have no idea what\u2019s going on,\u201d Lee told me on July 13th. \u201cWhy are people using our company name to do this kind of thing? It\u2019s kind of ridiculous.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n When I show him Odyssey Robot\u2019s sworn attestation that eTak assembles its drones, he says it must have picked his address out of a search engine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cNo, we don\u2019t assemble anything, we only refurbish,\u201d he says when I ask, adding that eTak doesn\u2019t have the manpower. He says he\u2019s recycled batteries for Taiwanese computer maker Wistron (which builds laptops for giants like HP and Dell), UV ink cartridges for Anker, and vacuums for Ecovacs, but he\u2019s never had a relationship with dronemaker DJI.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cThey are a huge company, they will not choose us,\u201d he says. \u201cIf they use our company name, it\u2019s not fair for us, it\u2019s not right.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But whoever\u2019s behind Odyssey Robot is likely to get away with the lies.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Since 2023, every foreign company selling wireless gadgets in the United States has theoretically needed an extra human in the loop, based in the United States. That February<\/a> is when the FCC added the requirement for a \u201cUS agent\u201d who it can legally serve papers to, and communicate with, so the FCC can enforce against a company that might be unreachable under international law.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But there\u2019s nothing in the rules<\/a> that requires anyone to verify the US agent is a known, reputable person with a working telephone number and email address, working out of an actual permanent office. And though the FCC might have guidelines<\/em> suggesting those things, Keller & Heckman partner Greg Kunkle tells The Verge<\/em> that it\u2019s unlikely anyone\u2019s bothering to check.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cTo my knowledge, there\u2019s no real vetting of the US agent,\u201d he tells The Verge<\/em>. \u201cIf you\u2019re making a misstatement, that\u2019s a rule violation, but I don\u2019t think the FCC or TCB is checking those actively. I\u2019m not sure anybody is.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Kunkle says that for the past decade or so, FCC authorizations haven\u2019t actually been handled by the FCC at all \u2014 the agency outsourced that role to roughly 40<\/a> private companies called TCBs, short for Telecommunications Certification Bodies. \u201cOnce the TCB finishes its process, you\u2019re good to go,\u201d says Kunkle, adding that those authorizations go straight into the FCC database with no more FCC input at all.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n A TCB could theoretically get in trouble for letting banned companies through, even lose its status \u2014 and the FCC does<\/em> ask TCBs not to take the \u201cUS agent\u201d at their word. The agency added specific guidelines this past December<\/a> about that, including the requirement for \u201ca valid physical US mailing address,\u201d not just a virtual mailbox or a vacant lot:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cTCBs should not rely solely on the applicant\u2019s certification,\u201d the FCC writes. If a TCB has any reason to believe that a gadget may<\/em> be banned, the FCC says it shouldn\u2019t process the application at all. And if a TCB decides it did the wrong thing, it should \u201cimmediately submit a KDB inquiry explaining the issue to the FCC,\u201d the agency adds.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But does that happen? We reached out to T\u00dcV Rheinland, the TCB that approved Odyssey Robot\u2019s FCC authorization, to let it know we were writing a story about Odyssey Robot making potentially fraudulent attestations, and the company still<\/em> couldn\u2019t find anything wrong.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cAs of today, we do not have any concrete evidence for questioning our certifications to Odyssey Robot. If there is a reasonable basis for questioning a certification, we will follow the procedures established by the FCC for such cases,\u201d T\u00dcV Rheinland communications manager Maximilian Gr\u00fcn told The Verge<\/em> on July 15th.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n T\u00dcV Rheinland said it hadn\u2019t received any communication from the FCC regarding Odyssey Robot, but also that Odyssey Robot did not forge the T\u00dcV Rheinland test reports attached to its FCC filing. Those were genuine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n If the TCBs do their jobs, it\u2019s possible they would catch some fake brands. The TCBs are supposed to audit 5 percent of all devices<\/a> they certify in a calendar year and report back to the FCC with their findings \u2014 including whether a company fails to provide a sample of a product for testing. Perhaps Odyssey Robot would have been the 1 in 20 and get caught that way.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But so far, the only \u201cDJI front companies\u201d we\u2019ve seen targeted by the FCC are the ones that journalists brought to the agency\u2019s attention.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n On July 10th, the FCC proposed $25,000 fines<\/a> against eight of the \u201cDJI front companies,\u201d noting that they were alerted to the brands through research from Konrad Iturbe and my own coverage on The Verge<\/em>. It justified the fines, and possibly further action, because those companies\u2019 US agents didn\u2019t even bother replying to the agency\u2019s letters.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n In 2024, the FCC similarly proposed over $700,000 in fines against Eken<\/a>, a Hong Kong-based video doorbell manufacturer that also failed to provide working contact information for a US agent. That time, it was journalists at Consumer Reports<\/em><\/a> who prompted the FCC to act.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But even if the FCC can issue a fine, it probably won\u2019t be able to collect.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Earlier this year, the agency cited the Eken case as evidence<\/a> that \u201cforeign actors in our equipment authorization have been able to evade US law when products they are responsible for have harmed American consumers.\u201d Even if a company pretends to be based in the US, the FCC can\u2019t reach them if they\u2019re actually in China instead.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n There might still be real financial consequences for some DJI front companies. On July 17th, the FCC took things up a notch by threatening to retroactively ban the DJI fronts\u2019 already-approved products<\/a> from import, sale, marketing, and distribution, which could be the end for successful brands like Xtra and Skyrover that snuck in before the ban.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But it seems like that might be where the FCC\u2019s direct powers of enforcement end. Former FCC enforcement chief Peter Hyun tells The Verge<\/em> that the agency will want to send a message to other companies not to do this thing, but the tools it has in its tool belt are forfeitures, cease and desist letters, and \u201cshow-cause\u201d orders where a company has to explain why its license shouldn\u2019t be revoked. The FCC could also theoretically help the Department of Justice bring a smuggling charge, he says.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Lying smugglers hiding behind disconnected phone numbers won\u2019t be stepping forward to provide their real identities, of course.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n On July 21st, a month and a half after Iturbe and The Verge <\/em>asked the FCC about Odyssey Robot for this story, the agency revealed it had sent a \u201cshow-cause\u201d order to the company<\/a> a few days after we tipped them off. The FCC\u2019s investigation was limited to sending letters to Odyssey and eTak and noting whether the two entities responded. Odyssey didn\u2019t respond. eTak denied any relationship with Odyssey.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n eTak replied to the FCC on July 13th, the same day I spoke to its founder on the phone.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The question now isn\u2019t what happens to the empty husk of Odyssey Robot, but how many other smugglers might sneak through when the agency isn\u2019t<\/em> tipped off. If the only reason the FCC caught Odyssey is a guy named Konrad \u2014 well, that\u2019s not how government agencies are supposed to work.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The FCC\u2019s consumer gadget bans are broken if they don\u2019t require anyone to do a basic Google search before legally approving banned gadgets for import and sale. They\u2019re broken if the FCC can\u2019t track down and make a meaningful example of a bad actor even after they\u2019re caught, because the same lies that made them invisible also shield them from consequences.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Since Odyssey hadn\u2019t yet begun selling drones in the US, revoking its FCC authorization likely wouldn\u2019t matter to its mystery owners. It wouldn\u2019t be surprising if their takeaway is to lie more carefully, rather than not lying at all.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n But it does seem that the FCC is attempting to close some loopholes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n At first, it seemed that the FCC was following the America First formula of punishing Chinese entities based on their affiliation rather than their actions \u2014 it took action against eight so-called \u201cbad labs\u201d<\/a> that test radios in China simply because Chinese state-sponsored entities had more than 10 percent equity. When it moved against SGS-CSTC Shenzhen<\/a>, a lab used by at least one DJI front, it didn\u2019t mention that front in its justification for the move.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n